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THE EFFECTS OF U.S. DEPORTATION
POLICIES ON IMMIGRANT FAMILIES AND
COMMUNITIES: CROSS-BORDER
PERSPECTIVES*
JACQUELINE HAGAN, BRIANNA CASTRO & NESTOR RODRIGUEZ**

Since the mid-1990s, the United States has enacted a series of laws
that makes it easier to arrest, detain, and deport noncitizens. These
laws, which have been highly criticized for the devastation they
have brought to immigrantfamilies, represent an abrupt departure
from post-World War H1 immigration policies, which provided
increasingrights to immigrants and their families. In this Article, we
examine the implications of changes in enforcement strategies for
those deported. Drawing on several studies conducted over a tenyear period, during which federal and local enforcement efforts
expanded substantially, we show how U.S. enforcement policies
have disrupted family ties and created stress in communities in
which immigrants live and work.
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INTRODUcTION

Since the mid-1990s, the United States has enacted a series of
laws that makes it easier to arrest, detain, and deport noncitizens. In
1996, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility

Act ("IIRIRA")' and the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act ("AEDPA")2 were signed into law by President Bill
Clinton. Five years later, following the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001, President George W. Bush signed into law the USA
PATRIOT Act.3 These three exclusionary laws, which have been

highly criticized for the devastation they have brought to immigrant
families,4 represent an abrupt departure from post-World War II

immigration policies, which provided increasing rights to immigrants
and their families.5 The effects of these laws on deportation levels,
now strategically called "removals, '' 6 have been dramatic. Between

1995 and 2008, deportations (with orders of removal) skyrocketed
from 50,924 to 358,886, representing over a six hundred percent

increase in just thirteen years.7 The consequences of deportation can

1. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 8
and 18 U.S.C.).
2. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 8, 18,
22, 28, 40, and 42 U.S.C.).
3. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified in scattered sections of 8, 15, 18,
22, 31, 42, 49, and 50 U.S.C.).
4. See DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 10-12 (2007); Jacqueline Hagan, Karl Eschbach & Nestor Rodriguez, U.S.
DeportationPolicy, Family Separation,and CircularMigration, 42 INT'L MIGRATION REV.
64, 64-66 (2008); see also RANDY CAPPS ET AL., URBAN INST., PAYING THE PRICE: THE
IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION RAIDS ON AMERICA'S CHILDREN 1-5 (2007), available at

http://www.urbaninstitute.org/UploadedPDF/411566-immigration-raids.pdf (discussing
the negative impact of the recent increase in immigration enforcement on children and
families).
5. Hagan et al., supra note 4, at 64.
6. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, U.S. CONG., IMMIGRATION POLICY IN THE UNITED

STATES 3 (2006),
Immigration.pdf.

available

at

http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs7Oxx/doc7O5l/02-28-

7. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2008
YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 95 (2009) [hereinafter IMMIGRATION

STATISTICS], available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2008/ois

_yb_2008.pdf.
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be severe. Depending on the reason, deportees are barred from
reentry into the United States anywhere from five years to life.'
Despite dramatic increases in the number of deportees since
1996, only a few studies have examined the economic, social, and
human costs of enforcement activities for deportees and their
families.9 In this Article, we examine the implications of changes in
enforcement strategies for those deported. We argue that although
the intended goal of contemporary U.S. deportation policy-an end
to the migration of undocumented or criminal migrants' 0-remains an
empirical question, this policy has had unintended consequences.
Drawing on several studies conducted over a ten-year period, during
which federal and local enforcement efforts expanded substantially,"
we show how U.S. enforcement policies have disrupted family ties
and created stress in immigrant communities. As such, the expansion
of federal and local immigration enforcement efforts since the mid1990s has raised the human costs for migrants and their families 2 and
undermined the post-World War II cornerstone of stated U.S.
immigration policy-family reunification.13
This Article is organized into three Parts. The first Part provides
a brief overview of U.S. immigration policy, focusing on policy
changes since the mid-1990s. Among these changes, we focus
especially on the extension of immigration enforcement activities
from the border to the interior of the United States and the growing
role of local law enforcement in regulating immigration. This Part
also shows how these changes in immigration policy have influenced
the composition and volume of deportations. The second Part
introduces several research projects that were launched to assess how
recent legislative initiatives affected immigrants, their families, and

8. See Immigration and Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9) (2006).
9. See Hagan et al., supra note 4, at 66-67. See generally Scott Phillips, Jacqueline
Maria Hagan & Nestor Rodriguez, BrutalBorders? Examining the Treatment of Deportees
During Arrest and Detention, 85 SoC. FORCES 93 (2006) (exploring the harmful effects of
detention laws and their enforcement). This lack of studies reflects, in large part, the
difficulty of locating, tracking, and studying deportees, a population whose behavior is
regulated by the state.
10. See, e.g., R. Andrew Chereck, Comment & Case Note, The Deportation of
Criminal Immigrants, 9 LAW & Bus. REV. AM. 609, 609-11 (2003) (concluding that the
recent immigration reforms of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
("AEDPA") and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
("IIRIRA") made deportation policy more strict, allowing more immigrants to be subject
to deportation).
11. See Hagan et al., supra note 4, at 66.
12. See id. at 83-85.
13. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 6, at 1.
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the communities in which they reside. The third Part addresses study
findings and their implications.
I. A RETURN TO A RESTRICTIVE UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION
POLICY?

The United States has long boasted that it is a nation of
immigrants. 4 Indeed, before 1875 the country had no federal
immigration policy."i In that year, Congress barred the entry of
convicts and prostitutes. 6 In 1882, the federal government further
extended its restrictive regulatory power with the passage of the
Chinese Exclusion Act,17 which was not repealed until 1943.18 Chinese
immigrants were contracted to work in the United States and
imported as early as the 1840s to fill labor shortages and help
construct the Transcontinental Railroad. 19 However, popular reaction
against Chinese immigrants surfaced upon completion of the railroad
when some ten thousand Chinese laborers lost their jobs, and
especially during the recessionary period from 1873 to 1878.20
Although difficult to enforce, the Chinese Exclusion Act placed a
moratorium on immigration from China, dismantled the Chinese
entrants' right to naturalize, and provided deportation procedures for
Chinese who were living in the United States without authorization. 2'
The exclusionary position of the federal immigration policy
sharpened from 1882 until 1924 when immigration policy expanded to
bar other foreign-born groups and limited the entry of persons on
qualitative grounds.22 These qualitative grounds included criminal
records, mental illness, and impoverishment. 23 During this era of
restriction, national origin quotas were applied to the Japanese in
1907 and then to all Asian immigrants in 1917.24
14. See KANSTROOM, supra note 4, at ix.
15. See HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS

IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 21,24 (2006).

16. Id. at 25 (referring to the Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, §§ 1, 5, 18 Stat. 477, 477
(repealed 1974)).
17. Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (repealed 1943).
18. MOTOMURA, supra note 15, at 25 (citing the Act of Dec. 17, 1943, ch. 344, 57 Stat.
600 as the legislative action that repealed the Chinese Exclusion Act).
19. Id. at 17.
20. Id.
21.

MICHAEL FIX &

JEFFREY

S.

PASSEL, URBAN INST.,

IMMIGRATION

AND

IMMIGRANTS: SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT 9-10 (1994), available at http://www

.urban.org/UploadedPDF/305184_immigrationjimmigrants.pdf.
22. See MOTOMURA, supranote 15, at 39-42, 126-27.
23. See id. at 40.
24. See Fix & PASSEL, supra note 21, at 10.
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In 1924, with the passage of the National Origins Act,25 the
federal government imposed numerical restrictions on immigration.26
The law placed a cap of 150,000 European immigrants per year and
permitted the admission of foreign-born persons based on the
proportion of national origin groups that resided in the United States
according to the 1890 census. Since the census preceded the great
waves of immigration from Eastern and Southern Europe, the Act
essentially skewed immigration in favor of persons from Northern
and Western Europe.28 In 1952, existing immigration laws were folded
into the Immigration and Nationality Act,29 which remains the
statutory framework for federal immigration law.30
The 1965 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act31
abolished the national origin quota system and marked the beginning
of a more inclusionary era in U.S. immigration policy, one that would
remain in place until the mid-1990s. The 1965 amendments replaced
the national origin quota system with a new and more uniform system
that placed a yearly limit of 20,000 people per country for all
countries outside of the Western hemisphere.32 The law, in part,
shifted where immigrants to the United States were coming from;
more immigrants would come from Latin America and Asia than
from Europe. Under the amendments, annual quotas were parceled
into " 'preferences'

for ... relatives of citizens and permanent

residents, for workers [with human capital], and for refugees."3 3 The
1965 amendments, built on principles of family unity, humanitarian
concerns, social integration, and immigrant rights, comprised, until
recently, the fundamental structure of U.S. admissions after World
War 11.34

25. Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153 (repealed 1952).
26. Id. § 11, 43 Stat. at 159-60.
27. See MOTOMURA, supra note 15, at 127.
28. See FIX & PASSEL, supranote 21, at 10.

29. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 8 U.S.C.).
30. MOTOMURA, supra note 15, at 130.
31. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 2, 79 Stat. 911, 911-12 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1152 (2006)).
32. Fix & PASSEL, supra note 21, at 10.
33. MOTOMURA, supra note 15, at 131 (referencing the Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L.
No. 89-236, § 203, 79 Stat. 911, 912-13).
34. See, e.g., Margot Mendelson, The Legal Production of Identities: A Narrative
Analysis of Conversations with Battered Undocumented Women, 19 BERKELEY WOMEN'S
L.J. 138, 141 (2004) (concluding that the 1965 amendments introduced "family
reunification as a central principle in immigration law").
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The passage of several exclusionary laws since the mid-1990s
represents an abrupt departure from the inclusionary principles of
post-World War II immigration policy and a return to the country's
restrictive position toward particular groups. The first of the three
laws, IIRIRA, increased removals by expanding the categories of

noncitizens subject to deportation, by restricting the ability of
migrants to appeal deportation, and by increasing the offenses for
which noncitizens could be deported.35 Although aggravated felonies

such as murder or drug trafficking have long been a basis for
deportation,3 6 IIRIRA expanded the definition of aggravated felonies

to include all crimes that required a prison sentence of a year or
more, even if the convicted felon had completed his or her sentence.37
Moreover, the 1996 law mandates retroactive punishment. 38 Thus,

pre-IIRIRA crimes not defined as aggravated felonies at the time of
conviction now become cause for deportation, even when convicted
noncitizens have served their prison sentence.39
AEDPA further strengthened the enforcement authority of the
federal government by largely dismantling judicial review for certain
categories of immigrants eligible for deportation."n Prior to AEDPA
and IIRIRA, an immigration judge had the discretionary authority to
cancel the deportation of noncitizens if it would cause "exceptional"

hardship for their families." After 1996, the criterion for cancelling a
deportation became "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship"

35. See J. Ryan Moore, Reinterpreting the Immigration and Nationality Act's
Categorical Bar to DiscretionaryRelief for "Aggravated Felons" in Light of International
Law: Extending Beharry v. Reno, 21 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 535, 536-39 (2004) (noting
IIRIRA's expansion of grounds for deportation); Jill M. Pfenning, Inadequate and
Ineffective: Congress Suspends the Writ of Habeas Corpus for Noncitizens Challenging
Removal Orders by Failing to Provide a Way to Introduce New Evidence, 31 VT. L. REV.
735, 743-44 (2007) (describing how IIRIRA limited judicial review).
36. See Nancy Morawetz, Understandingthe Impact of the 1996 DeportationLaws and
the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936, 1955, 1959 (2000)
[hereinafter Morawetz, Understandingthe Impact]; see also Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking
Retroactive Deportation Laws and the Due Process Clause, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 107-09
(1998) (reviewing the crimes that would lead to deportation prior to 1996).
37. Morawetz, Understandingthe Impact, supra note 36, at 1939-41 (commenting on
the expansion of the definition of "aggravated felonies" following AEDPA and ItRIRA).
38. See id.
39. See Hagan et al., supra note 4, at 65.
40. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
§ 505(e)(2), 110 Stat. 1214, 1264-65 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1535(e) (2006)).
41. See Sara A. Martin, Postcardsfrom the Border: A Result-Oriented Analysis of
Immigration Reform Under the AEDPA and IIRIRA, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 683, 701
(1999) (concluding that AEDPA and IIRIRA "significantly curtail[ed] the discretionary
power of the immigration judge").
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for the noncitizen's family.4 2 With the limitations of judicial review,
AEDPA and IIRIRA reduced immigrants' likelihood of success on
appeal, thereby reducing their chances of relief, even if they had
family ties in the United States.
Following September 11, 2001, lawmakers increasingly linked
national security concerns to immigration. In October 2001, Congress
passed the USA PATRIOT Act, which further expanded the
categories of immigrants eligible for deportation by increasing
administrative discretion and authority to deport groups of
immigrants who are perceived as threats to national security or seen
as opposing U.S. foreign policy.43
In March of 2003, the Bush administration created the
Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"), thereby streamlining
the former immigration and border control responsibilities of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service and increasing the
government's capacity to carry out expanded enforcement operations
in the name of national security.' With the formation of DHS in 2003
came the creation of Immigration and Customs Enforcement
("ICE"), a new agency dedicated to detaining and deporting
noncitizens who violate U.S. immigration laws, especially in the
interior United States and often after their arrival.45 Consequently, as
Daniel Kanstroom argues, since 1996, and especially after September
11, 2001, attempts to control undocumented migration have
increasingly extended from the border to the interior of the United
States.46 Kanstroom refers to this development as "post-entry social
control," in that these new deportation laws "routinely 47govern
conduct for a specific period following the time of admission.
As a result of expanded interior enforcement, the location where
immigrants are apprehended and composition of the deportee
population have shifted. While most pre-1996 removals included
young men removed through expedited removal at ports of entry,

42. See id.
43. Mark B. Salter, Passports,Mobility, and Security: How Smart Can the Border Be?,
5 INT'L STUD. PERSP. 71, 78-80 (2004) (commenting on a regime whereby border officials
are to make many assessments based largely on appearance).
44. See ELIZABETH C. BORJA, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., BRIEF
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 2001-2008,

at 12 (2008), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/brief-documentary-history
of dhs_2001_2008.pdf.
45. See U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, About, http://www.ice.gov
about/index.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2010).
46. See KANSTROOM, supra note 4, at 8,14.
47. Id. at 6.
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removals now include many men and women who are removed
without legal process from many communities across the United
States.48 The interior removal of immigrants, many of whom have
strong work and family ties, has been facilitated by a series of interior
enforcement initiatives launched by ICE that target immigrant

communities and return to the state the power to regulate
49
immigration and enforce policy.
The first of these, the National Fugitive Operations Program
("NFOP"), which was launched in 2003, is intended to advance

national security by locating and removing dangerous fugitive aliens,
who the NFOP defines as noncitizens who have been ordered
deported by an immigration judge but have not departed the country
or who have failed to report to DHS as required." According to

former Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff, who touted
NFOP's success, the program was also designed as a strategy "to link
interior immigration
enforcement
with national security
imperatives."'" Despite the program's rapid and enormous expansion
in funds and staff to support the program goals (from $9 million in
fiscal year ("FY") 2003 to $218 million in FY 2008), NFOP has failed

its mission.5 2 To meet mandated quotas in 2006,11 NFOP teams
increasingly began to arrest immigration status violators instead of
immigrants with criminal records or outstanding deportation orders.5 4
As a result, according to a recent analysis of NFOP practices and

48. See Brianna Mullis, Neither Here nor There: An Examination of U.S.
Immigration Enforcement Policy and Undocumented Migration 18, 34-36 (Mar. 31, 2009)
(unpublished honors thesis, University of North Carolina) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review); see also CAPPS ET AL., supra note 4, at 24-26 (interviewing several
individuals who had been deported without "access to a lawyer or an official from their
consulate").
49. See Press Release, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Department of
Homeland Security Unveils Comprehensive Immigration Enforcement Strategy for the
Nation's Interior (Apr. 20, 2006), http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pressrelease
_0890.shtm.
50. MARGARET MENDELSON ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INST., COLLATERAL
DAMAGE: AN EXAMINATION OF ICE's FUGITIVE OPERATIONS PROGRAM 1 (2009),

availableat http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/NFOPFeb09.pdf.
51. Muzaffar Chishti & Claire Bergeron, Obama Administration Signals It May
Review a Number of Bush Immigration Policies, MIGRATION INFO. SOURCE (Migration
Policy Inst., Washington, D.C.), Feb. 18, 2009, http://www.migrationinformation.org/
USFocus/display.cfm?ID=720; see Press Release, U.S. Immigration & Customs
Enforcement, supra note 49.
52. MENDELSON ET AL., supra note 50, at 1-2.
53. See generally id. at 10 (noting the increased goal of one thousand arrests).
54. Id. at 11 (finding that the number of arrests of fugitive aliens with criminal
convictions constituted only nine percent of total arrests).
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accomplishments, nearly three-quarters of those arrested had no
criminal record and had never been before a judge.55
Another interior enforcement operation that treats immigrants
living and working in the United States as criminals is a program that
trains state and local police to identify and turn over to ICE any
suspect criminal immigrants they encounter during their regular lawenforcement activities. Known as 287(g), after the 1996 IIRIRA
provision authorizing its addition to the Immigration and Nationality
Act,5 6 the program has expanded considerably in recent years,
training and certifying close to a thousand officers, who, in 2008
alone, lodged immigration charges against roughly 43,000
immigrants.57 Community members have expressed concerns with the
287(g) program, worried that some officers are deporting aliens
because of5 8"minor traffic violations (e.g., speeding)" and are "racial
profiling.
Increasingly, many immigrants apprehended through border and
interior enforcement activities find themselves in federal or local
detention facilities for an indefinite period of time and often without
access to a lawyer.59 "The [average daily detention] population
increased by 129 percent, from 9,011 to 20,594, between FY 1996,
when IIRIRA was enacted, and FY 2006. " 60 A recent study
completed by the Associated Press found that of 32,000 persons in
detention on January 25, 2008, an ordinary Sunday evening, 18,690
were noncitizens without a criminal conviction of any kind. 61 Even
more startling, approximately 400 noncitizens in that group had been
incarcerated for over a year even though they had no criminal
record.62 Moreover, because ICE does not have the detention
capacity to house the growing detainee population, it regularly
55. Id. (referring to the percent of arrests from 2003 through February 2008).
56. Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 133, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-563 to -564 (1996) (codified at
8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006)).
57. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT:
BETTER CONTROLS NEEDED OVER PROGRAM AUTHORIZING STATE AND LOCAL
ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAWS 5-6 (2009), available at http://www.gao

.gov/new.items/d09109.pdf.
58. Id. at 6.
59. See AMNESTY INT'L, JAILED WITHOUT JUSTICE: IMMIGRATION DETENTION IN
THE USA 6 (2009), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/uploads/JailedWithoutJustice
.pdf.
60. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REPORT FOR 109TH CONG.,
ENFORCEMENT WITHIN THE UNITED STATES, at CRS-22 (2006).

IMMIGRATION

61. Michelle Roberts, Immigrants Face Detention, Few Rights, FOX NEWS PHOENIX,
Mar. 16, 2009, http://www.myfoxphoenix.com/dpp/news/immigrants-detention-rights
031609.
62. Id.
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contracts with local jails, where detainees are often placed in cells
alongside criminals and remain in custody for months, often without
access to a lawyer.63
Figure 1: Formal Removals from United States, 1900-2008"
400,000
350,000

300,000
250,000
200,000
150,000
100,000

50,000
0
1900 1912 1924 1936

1948 1960 1972 1984 1996 2008
Years

The increase in the number of detentions correlates with
elevated levels of deportations. As Figure 1 shows, between 1920 and
1990, the number of removals remained fairly consistent, averaging
around 20,000 removals per year. After 1990, the number of removals
began to inch up, reflecting the expanded legal powers of the federal
government and local police to arrest, detain, and deport noncitizens.
Between 1990 and 1995, removals averaged approximately 40,000
each year.65 In 1996, the number of removals surged. From 1996
through 2005, yearly removals averaged around 180,000 and then
began increasing until peaking with the removal of 358,886
noncitizens in 2008. 6

63.
64.
65.
66.

See AMNESTY

INT'L, supra note

59, at 29.

IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 7, at 96-104.

Hagan et al., supra note 4, at 66.
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 7, at 95.
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Table 1. Removals by Country of Originin FY 200867
Country of Nationality
Mexico
Honduras
Guatemala
El Salvador
Nicaragua
Other Countries
Total

Tota Number Removed
246,851 (68.8%)
28,851 (8.0%)
27,594 (7.7%)
20,031 (5.6%)
2,250 (0.6%)
33,309 (9.3%)
358,886 (100.0%)

% Criminals
29%
17%
15%
24%
22%
36%
(97,133)

Although the federal government claims that its deportation
campaign is designed to target immigrants who have committed
serious violent crimes, 68 most of the removals are noncriminal and
target immigrants from Mexico and Central America. 69 As Table 1
shows, in FY 2008, 358,886 noncitizens were removed from the
United States. Of these, almost sixty-nine percent (246,851) were
from Mexico and nearly twenty-two percent (78,726) were from
Central America. As the table also shows, a small percentage of the
Latin American deportee populations were removed for criminal
violations. 71 Our current de facto immigration policy--deportationrepresents a return to the pre-World War II restrictive position of
federal immigration policy that barred the entry and limited the
settlement of particular categories and groups of immigrants.7 1
Despite dramatic increases in the deportee population in recent
decades, only a few studies have examined the implications of
increased enforcement for the deportees themselves, reflecting, in
large part, the difficulty of doing research on a population that is
closely monitored by the state." In this Article, we examine how
deportation policy has disrupted family ties and created stress in U.S.
communities where immigrants are concentrated. We address the
effects of deportation over a ten-year period, from 1998 to 2008, a

67. Mullis, supra note 48, at 6-7.
68. See U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, National Fugitive Operations
Program, http://www.ice.gov/pi/dro/nfop.htm (last visited May 4, 2010).
69. See supra Table 1.
70. See IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 7, at 102-04.
71. See supra notes 14-28 and accompanying text.
72. See Phillips et al., supra note 9, at 93. See generally Hagan et al., supra note 4
(assessing the social lives of three hundred El Salvadorans who were deported from the
United States).
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period during which national and local enforcement efforts expanded
substantially, especially in the interior United States.
II. METHODOLOGY, STUDY SITES, AND SAMPLES
This study draws on findings from face-to-face interviews with
immigrants and their families in several Texas communities in 1998,
immigrants and their families in one North Carolina community in
2008 and 2009, and deportees in El Salvador in 2002 and 2008.
Collectively, these data sets from both sides of the border paint a
portrait of fear, stress, family separation, and economic hardship as a
result of current U.S. deportation policy.
In 1997, two of the authors, Rodriguez and Hagan, launched a
study to explore the effects of IIRIRA and the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
("PRWORA")7 3 on immigrants and the communities in which they

live. PRWORA reduced or eliminated eligibility for social welfare
programs for legal immigrants during their first five years of residence
in the United States. 74 The study involved interviews with immigrants
and community leaders in five research communities in Texas-El
Paso, Hidalgo, Laredo, Houston, and Fort Worth. The three border
cities of El Paso, Hidalgo, and Laredo were selected because they are
major migrant crossing corridors with significant Border Patrol
activity. In contrast, the two interior cities of Houston and Fort
Worth were selected because of their large, established immigrant
populations and "remoteness from areas of intensified border
enforcement."76

In each of these five sites in Texas, we interviewed community
leaders and immigrant residents.77 From service providers,
73. See Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 408(a)(7), 110 Stat. 2105, 2137-38 (1996) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 608(a)(7) (2006)).
74. See generally Jacqueline Hagan & Nestor Rodriguez, Resurrecting Exclusion: The
Effects of 1996 U.S. Immigration Reform on Communities and Families in Texas, El

Salvador, and Mexico, in LATINOS: REMAKING AMERICA 190 (Marcelo M. Su6rezOrozco & Mariela M. Piez eds., 2002) (researching the implications of IIRIRA and the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act ("PRWORA") on
communities in Texas, El Salvador, and Mexico).
75. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INS' SOUTHWEST BORDER STRATEGY:
RESOURCE AND IMPACT ISSUES REMAIN AFTER SEVEN YEARS 2, 4, 8 (2001), available at

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01842.pdf (detailing border patrol strategies along the
U.S.-Mexico border in El Paso and Laredo); Nestor Rodriguez & Jacqueline Maria
Hagan, Fractured Families and Communities: Effects of Immigration Reform in Texas,
Mexico, and El Salvador,2 LATINO STUD. 328, 332 (2004).

76. Rodriguez & Hagan, supra note 75, at 333.
77. Id. at 333-34.
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government officials, educators, and leaders of community-based
organizations, we solicited views concerning the implementation of
IIRIRA and PRWORA and the effects of the Acts on the migrant
client populations." The study also included interviews with the head
of the household or the spouse of one hundred immigrants in mixed
status households.79 The interviewees included both undocumented
and legal residents. 0
By 2008, when the study launched a second series of community
interviews to gauge the effects of expanded enforcement policies,
enforcement efforts had devolved to the local level. More than one
thousand police officers in twenty-four states had signed on to the
287(g) program and were cooperating with ICE in the apprehension,
detention, and deportation of immigrants.8 ' We selected North
Carolina because it is a leading state in the implementation of the
287(g) program. 2 In 2007 alone, 3,100 immigrants in North Carolina
were placed in deportation proceedings through 287(g); more than
1,200 of those were detained due to traffic violations. 3
Within North Carolina, we selected Johnston County as our
research site because it is home to a diverse Latino population and its
sheriff's office supports the 287(g) program.'M In fall of 2008 and
spring and summer of 2009, Brianna Castro interviewed fifty Latino
residents in the community, most of whom were long-term residents
and business owners, to explore how the Latino community was
navigating local enforcement efforts.
South of the border, we focused on the deportee population in El
Salvador because it remains one of the few countries that has
established programs to resettle return migrants deported from the
United States. The program, Bienvenido a Casa ("BAC"), or
78. Id.
79. Id. at 334.
80. Id.
81. Office of State & Local Coordination, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement,
Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act
(2010), http://www.ice.govlpilnews/factsheets/section287_g.htm.
82. See id. (showing that only Virginia has more participating agencies, nine, than
North Carolina, eight); DEBORAH M. WEISSMAN, REBECCA C. HEADEN & KATHERINE
LEWIS PARKER, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, THE POLICIES AND POLITICS OF LOCAL

IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT LAWS: 287(g) PROGRAM IN NORTH CAROLINA 17 (2009),
availableat http://www.law.unc.edu/documents/clinicalprograms/287gpolicyreview.pdf.
83. Benjamin Niolet, Sheriffs Line Up 3,100 to Deport, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,

N.C.), Nov. 19, 2008, at lB.
84. See WEISSMAN ET AL., supra note 82, at 29-30; U.S. Census Bureau, State &
County Quickfacts, Johnston County, North Carolina, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/
states/37/37101.html (last visited May 4, 2010).
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"Welcome Home," provides researchers relatively easy access to a
population that is generally difficult to locate and track." Initially
implemented with the support of Catholic Relief Services, the
International Organization for Migration, and the U.S. Department
of State, the mission of BAC has been to ease the reintegration of
deportees into Salvadoran society.86 The mission was compromised in
2004, when the Salvadoran Ministry of Justice and Security assumed

partial responsibility for the program's directorship.87 Since then, the
program has slowly transformed from a reintegration program to a

regulatory program aimed at monitoring the location and behavior of
the deportee population in El Salvador.88 From 2004 through March
2008, BAC processed 68,074 deportees from the United States.8 9

In 2001, two of the authors, Hagan and Rodriguez, met with the
then BAC director and agreed to collaborate with BAC to collect indepth data on a random sample of Salvadoran deportees. Rodriguez
and Scott Phillips, a criminologist, traveled to El Salvador to design
the sample and train interviewers. From June through December of
2002, a total of three hundred Salvadoran deportees were

interviewed. Six years later, in 2008, the authors attempted to conduct
a follow-up study with a subsample of the Salvadoran deportees

interviewed in 2002. One of the authors, Castro, traveled to El
Salvador during the summer of 2008 to further investigate the
viability of this research strategy.
Unfortunately, for practical and administrative reasons, the
original plan to reinterview in 2008 the three hundred interviewees
interviewed in 2002 was not feasible. By summer 2008, BAC was part
85. Hagan et al., supra note 4, at 68.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See Mullis, supra note 48, at 61-63 (commenting on the transition of the BAC
from an independent organization to a government-run operation).
89. Ministry of Justice & Security, Salvadorefios Deportados 2008 (Dec. 8, 2009),
http://www.seguridad.gob.sv/index.php?option=com-content&view=article&id=128&1tem
id=146 (reporting 20,203 deportees from the United States in 2008); Ministry of Justice &
Security, Salvadorefios Deportados 2007 (Dec. 8, 2009), http://www.seguridad.gob.sv/index
20,111
(reporting
.php?option=comcontent&view=article&id=127&Itemid=146
deportees from the United States in 2007); Ministry of Justice & Security, Salvadorefios
Deportados 2006 (Dec. 8, 2009), http://www.seguridad.gob.sv/index.php?option=com
_content&view=article&id=126&Itemid=146 (reporting 14,295 deportees from the United
States in 2006); Ministry of Justice & Security, Salvadorefios Deportados 2005 (Dec. 8,
2009), http://www.seguridad.gob.sv/index.php?option=comcontent&view=article&id=125
&Itemid=146 (reporting 7,117 deportees from the United States in 2005); Ministry of
2004
(Dec.
8,
2009),
Salvadorefios
Deportados
Justice
&
Security,
http://www.seguridad.gob.sv/index.php?option=com-content&view=article&id=124&ltem
id=146 (reporting 6,248 deportees from the United States in 2004).
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of El Salvador's Ministry of Migration and Foreign Affairs and, in its
charge, access to BAC records was denied. The research strategy was
altered to respond to these new conditions. Although BAC denied
access to the records of previously processed deportees, Castro was
granted permission to interview current and recently arrived
deportees, but only in the government facility that housed BAC and
only under the supervision of the government official that directed
the program. Under these restricted conditions and using a
government interview guide and a supplemental schedule that
included some of the questions from the 2002 study, fifty-nine
deportees were interviewed during the summer of 2008.
III. STUDY FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS

A.

Community Impacts

The findings from the immigrant household surveys in the five
Texas communities paint a picture of anxiety, stress, and confusion as
a result of increased enforcement through IIRIRA and the uneven
implementation of PRWORA, the latter of which denied health
services to some groups of immigrants.9 0 Over sixteen percent of the
510 respondents reported that they or a household member had been
stopped by immigration officials and questioned about their
citizenship status.91 Some were stopped while driving; others, while
carrying out daily life, such as walking to work, strolling in the park,
or collecting children at school.' Moreover, thirty-nine percent of
those questioned were arrested for an immigration violation.93 Of
those stopped by an immigration official, approximately two-thirds of
the respondents were stopped in one of the U.S. border cities that
straddle the U.S.-Mexico border: Hidalgo, Laredo, and El Paso.94 In
these border cities, the presence of Border Patrol agents intensified
during the mid- to late-1990s, when a series of enforcement
campaigns (Operations Gatekeeper, Hold-the-Line, and Rio Grande)
were launched in urban crossing areas along the U.S-Mexico border.
90. Rodriguez & Hagan, supra note 75, at 337-41.
91. Id. at 340.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Jacqueline Hagan et al., The Effects of Recent Welfare and Immigration Reforms
on Immigrants' Access to Health Care, 37 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 444, 457 (2003); see
Susan Lieberman Goodwin, Conservation Connections in a Fragmented Desert
Environment: The U.S.-Mexico Border, 40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 989, 997-1001 (2000)
(discussing Operation Gatekeeper and Operation Rio Grande and their role in preventing
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Service providers, such as teachers and health care workers, in all
the Texas sites expressed concern that immigrants might voluntarily
withdraw from services for which they were entitled because they
feared that the use of public services could place them at greater risk
for deportation or jeopardize future opportunities to naturalize or
sponsor the migration of family members.96 Their fears proved
prescient: "[Staff] in county and city health clinics that provide
preventive and nutritional services, such as pre-natal care,
immunizations, and Women, Infants, Children dietary supplements,"
reported a decline in their immigrant clients.97 According to several
health workers, immigrants were withdrawing from any governmentfunded services for fear of deportation.98
Educators reported that families of students had mixed reactions
to increased immigration enforcement. At the Fort Worth and
Houston research sites, school administrators documented enrollment
declines in some district schools that they believed were due to new
immigration enforcement measures.9 9 In El Paso, the decline in
student enrollment had started with the "increase of border
enforcement.""l In the other border communities of Hidalgo and
Laredo, school personnel noticed increased "Border Patrol visibility
on streets near their schools." '' At the Houston site, an administrator
of a school in an immigrant neighborhood believed that fear among
undocumented immigrant families resulted in the observed decline in
parent attendance at school meetings.1 2 That was Texas in 1998, only
two years after implementation of IIRIRA.
By 2008, ten years later, enforcement efforts had moved to
communities in the interior United States and local police were now
heavily involved in enforcement efforts.1 ' The research conducted in
Johnston County, North Carolina, documents the devastating
economic, social, and psychological effects of expanded interior

illegal immigration into the United States); David A. Martin, Two Cheers for Expedited
Removal in the New Immigration Laws, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 673, 684 (2000) (noting the
development of Operations Hold-the-Line and Gatekeeper and commenting on their
shifting strategy from detecting illegal immigrants in the United States to preventing the
entry of illegal immigrants into the United States).
96. Hagan et al., supra note 95, at 457.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Rodriguez & Hagan, supra note 75, at 338.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See Press Release, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, supra note 49.
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enforcement on immigrant families and the communities where they
live.
In Johnston County, immigrants reported that they were
particularly concerned about local police acting as ICE agents
through the 287(g) program. Latinos in Johnston County reported
being afraid to contact the police when they had a problem."
Immigrants in North Carolina are unable to obtain a driver's license,
but they still need to drive in order to work. Thus, on a daily basis
they risk being cited by police for driving without a license, which in
turn leads to deportation." 5 The alternative is not working, which is
not a viable option. Several respondents reported that they were
regularly followed by police and pulled over for no apparent
reason. 1 6 In one case, a mechanic and legal immigrant reported that
he was arrested and detained for several days for not having a driver's
license when he was moving a car from the parking lot into the garage
of his mechanic shop. 10 7 The fear of driving without a license has
become so severe that posted on bulletin boards in some Latino
businesses are flyers advertising for-profit driving services by Latinos
with driver's licenses for unlicensed drivers who need to get to and
10 8
from work.
Immigrant fears are well-founded. More than half of the fifty
persons interviewed in Johnston County knew of someone who had
been arrested by a local police officer and was subsequently deported.
Some Latino immigrants felt that they had been singled out by police
officers as an attempt to force them out of town.0 9 This feeling of
exclusion is reinforced through changes in immigrant behavior in the
community, which result from a fear of apprehension. Many
immigrants withdrew from the community.10 Some reported that they
no longer attended community events or visited the library, and some
avoided public places, like parks, altogether."' Others went so far as
104. See, e.g., Interview by Brianna Castro with anonymous source, undocumented
immigrant, in Selma, N.C. (June 1, 2009).
105. See WEISSMAN ET AL., supra note 82, at 24 (commenting on how current
legislation prevents a number of undocumented immigrants from obtaining driver's
licenses, leading to increased arrests).
106. See, e.g., Interview by Brianna Castro with anonymous source, supranote 104.
107. Interview by Brianna Castro with anonymous source, undocumented immigrant,
in Smithfield, N.C. (June 11, 2009).
108. Interviews by Brianna Castro with anonymous sources, undocumented
immigrants, in Johnston County, N.C. (conducted between June 2009 and December
2009).
109. See, e.g., Interview by Brianna Castro with anonymous source, supra note 107.
110. Interviews by Brianna Castro with anonymous sources, supra note 108.
111. Id.
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to state that they spent most of their non-working hours in their
homes because it was the safest strategy to avoid detection by the
12
police.1
Local economies are also suffering as a result of community
policing, and businesses that cater to Latino clients have been
especially hard hit. Business owners reported that their sales had
plummeted between thirty and ninety percent in the past year, and
they attributed most of this decline to the loss of the Latino
clientele." 3 Restaurant managers and owners, in particular,
complained that their sales have declined significantly because Latino
customers fear driving to their establishments." 4
Recognizing that they could be deported at any moment, some
immigrants stopped investing in a long-term future in North Carolina
and started sending most of their earnings to family in Latin
America.'15 Immigrants reported that they stopped eating out at
restaurants and shopping on a regular basis for clothes, furniture,
cars, and other expenditures that tied them to life in the United
States." 6 This way, they reasoned, they would not lose their hardearned dollars if they were suddenly arrested but would have savings
waiting for them if they were deported home."7
Immigrant and nonimmigrant residents alike readily identified
local law enforcement who had taken enforcement into their own
hands, vigilantly monitoring immigrants in the community and
needlessly harassing them. A former business owner's story
particularly highlights well-founded concerns about the proper role of
local law enforcement in immigration matters and the economic
consequences of the 287(g) program. Juan is a Honduran immigrant
who has lived more than ten years in North Carolina and is a
permanent resident." 8 After thinking for years that Latinos in
112. Id.
113. See, e.g., Interview by Brianna Castro with anonymous source, undocumented
immigrant, in Smithfield, N.C. (Feb. 2, 2009).
114. See, e.g., Interview by Brianna Castro with anonymous source, undocumented
immigrant, in Selma, N.C. (Feb. 23, 2009); Interview by Brianna Castro with anonymous
source, undocumented immigrant, in Smithfield, N.C. (Feb. 9, 2009).
115. See, e.g., Interview by Brianna Castro with anonymous source, undocumented
immigrant, in Angier, N.C. (July 23, 2009).
116. Interviews by Brianna Castro with anonymous sources, supra note 108.
117. Id.
118. Interview by Brianna Castro with anonymous source, undocumented immigrant,
in Smithfield, N.C. (Aug. 13, 2009). To avoid unnecessary redundancy related to citations,
the North Carolina Law Review is omitting id. citations when referring to an interview
that was previously cited and where there is a minimal chance of confusion regarding
which interview provided the information. When such omission occurs, there will be an id.
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Johnston County needed somewhere to relax and have fun on the
weekends, he opened a small nightclub in Johnston County. During
the first few months Juan's nightclub was open, things went well. He
had many customers and started making a little profit as his club
quickly became a hotspot for the Latino immigrant community on the
weekends. It was not long, however, before local police set up license
checkpoints on Friday and Saturday nights on the street right in front
of his club. Police also began frequently coming into the club and
walking around to "observe" to make sure no illegal activity was
taking place inside. The combination of license checkpoints and the
police presence inside the club scared off the majority of Juan's
customers in a community already very afraid of the police. 9
Juan's second obstacle was complying with the constantly
changing regulations of the town manager. According to Juan,
American-owned bars were not bothered with the same changing
requirements that the town manager imposed on his establishment.
First, he was not required to serve any food. This changed, and he was
required to serve food to stay open. By the end, he was required to
have a full kitchen and dinner menu in order to serve alcohol.
Eventually, Juan had to close his club because he could not add a full
kitchen and dinner menu. Juan fought the closure for six months with
the aid of an attorney on the local town council, claiming that the
request was discriminatory and unreasonable. It looked as though
Juan would win his case, but, unfortunately, his attorney was later
arrested for charging Latino clients for legal services that he did not
provide.12 °
Other studies have documented concerns about racial profiling
and intimidation by local police as a result of 287(g). 2 ' According to a
recent nationwide investigation of the program by the United States
Government Accountability Office, some local police have used their
authority under the 287(g) program to process removals for
immigrants stopped for minor violations, such as speeding, and to go
to people's homes and question the legal status of the household

citation included at the end of the paragraph to refer readers back to the relevant
interview.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See WEISSMAN ET AL., supra note 82, at 27-32; U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, supra note 57, at 6.
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residents.'22 As implemented, the 287(g) program can lead to the
disregarding of basic constitutional rights."2
Throughout the country, immigrants' fear as a result of expanded
immigration enforcement is also well-documented. In a 2007
nationwide survey of Latinos, the Pew Hispanic Center found that
concerns over immigration enforcement were substantial.124 The
survey found that over half of all Latinos (fifty-three percent) worried
"a lot" or "some" that they or a family member or a close friend
could be deported. 21 In addition, Latino attitudes concerning specific
enforcement measures reflected more concern than the non-Latino
attitudes.1 26 Although seventy-five percent of Latinos in the survey
disapproved of workplace raids, forty-two percent of non-Latinos
disapproved of this measure. 2 1 While seventy-nine percent of
Hispanics disapproved of local police taking an active role in
immigration enforcement, forty-nine percent of non-Hispanics
disapproved of this measure.128
B.

Family Separationand Subsequent Psychologicaland Economic
Hardship

Most international migration involves some form of temporary
family separation, but for deportees and their families, the process is
especially complicated and the consequences are especially severe. If
deportees have a spouse or child in the United States, then they could
find themselves in a situation in which they are separated indefinitely
from loved ones who may have depended on the deported family
member's earnings. Moreover, under current U.S. enforcement

122. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 57, at 11.
123. The Fourth Amendment establishes "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S.
CONST. amend. IV. "The home 'is accorded the full range of Fourth Amendment
protections,' [because] there exists a justified expectation of privacy against unreasonable
intrusion." 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 2.3(b), at 565 (4th ed. 2004) (quoting Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206,
211 (1966)). If law enforcement officials approach homes without warrants and demand
proof of citizenship status, this "expectation of privacy" is lost.
124. PEW HISPANIC CTR., 2007 NATIONAL SURVEY

OF LATINOS: As ILLEGAL

IMMIGRATION ISSUE HEATS UP, HISPANICS FEEL A CHILL 1 (2007), available at

http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/84.pdf (summarizing a survey revealing that over half
of Hispanic adults fear that they or someone close to them will be deported from the
United States).
125. Id. at 19.
126. Id. at 2.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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policy, this separation could last anywhere from five years to life.129
On the other hand, for those deportees who left a spouse or child or
both in their home country, ironically, deportation may lead to family
reunification. However, it is very possible that this reunification may
not be welcomed by family members since the deportee may no
longer be able to remit earnings or find work in the home country to
support them.
These complex family ties, separations, and reunifications are
characteristic of the deportees and their families in both the 2002 and
2008 samples in El Salvador. Among the three hundred deportees
interviewed in El Salvador in 2002, "about half of the sample (147)
1 3 "Among these, 58 percent reported that
reported being married.""
their spouses lived in the United States, while 39 percent reported
The study also
that their spouses resided in El Salvador."''
documented separation of deportees from children born in the
United States. "Among the 165 deportees [who reported that they did
have children], a large majority (73 percent) reported that they had a
child under the age of 18 living in the United States.' 32 Moreover,
1' 33
"90 percent of these children were born in the United States.'
Another 11 percent "reported [having] a child in El Salvador."' 34 The
with children "did not report where their
remaining deportees
' 35
children lived.'
More than three-quarters of the fifty-nine deportees interviewed
in 2008 in El Salvador had been living and working in the United
States for less than five years; thus, their work and family ties were
not as established as those found among the 2002 sample.
Nonetheless, one in every seven of the fifty-nine deportees
interviewed reported leaving behind either a spouse or child in the
United States.
Deportation poses economic hardship for family members on
both sides of the border. Almost eighty percent of the deportees in
the 2002 and 2008 samples in El Salvador were working at the time of
their arrest and subsequent deportation.13 6 Because deportation
severs the migrant from the labor force and, thus, from income-

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

See Immigration and Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9) (2006).
Hagan et al., supra note 4, at 77.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 72.
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generating activities, the separation poses huge economic costs to the
families in U.S. households who ironically may become reliant on
U.S. taxpayers and government assistance in the absence of the
breadwinner. The consequences of deportation also affect the wellbeing of family members in El Salvador, who were often dependent
on remittances from the breadwinner. Indeed, close to three quarters
of the deportees in the 2002 sample reported sending a median
monthly remittance of roughly $200 to their spouses and parents, who
used the funds for daily subsistence expenses such as "food, clothing,
and health care.'

37

Deportation also poses huge emotional and psychological
consequences for deportees and their families. The physical removal
of parents can have long-lasting traumatic effects on children and
spouses left behind in the United States.'38 Returning migrants also
experience multiple traumas as they attempt to reintegrate into a
country, culture, and society that they may have left years before.'3 9
The trauma of reintegration, coupled with the loss of work and
separation from family, has major implications for the future
settlement intentions of many Salvadoran deportees, as the case of
Miguel demonstrates. 4 °
Because Miguel was envious of the watches, clothes, and cars
that his Salvadoran friends brought back with them from the United
States, he decided to follow the dream of many of his friends and
head north when he turned sixteen. He traveled directly to New York
City where he located a room in a crowded apartment with other new
migrants. Working at minimum wage as a dishwasher he feared he
might never attain the American Dream, but nonetheless, he
persevered. With time, things improved: Miguel located better jobs
and opened a savings account; applied for and received permanent
resident status under the 1986 legalization program; and five years

137. Id. at 81.
138. See CAPPS ET AL., supra note 4, at 1 ("There are approximately five million U.S.
children with at least one undocumented parent. The recent intensification of immigration
enforcement activities by the federal government has increasingly put these children at
risk of family separation, economic hardship, and psychological trauma."); Robert J.
Lopez, Rich Connell & Chris Kraul, Gang Uses Deportationto Its Advantage to Flourishin
U.S., L.A. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2005, at Al (documenting how increased deportation leads to
an uptick in Latino and Latina gang violence).
139. Hagan et al., supra note 4, at 83--84.
140. See Interview by Brianna Castro with anonymous source, undocumented
immigrant, in Santa Tecla, El Salvador (June 25, 2008).
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after his arrival, met and fell in love with his future wife. They
married and had five children.14'
All was well until the day in 2008 when Miguel was in a car
accident in which the other driver died. Miguel was not drinking or
driving recklessly, but his license had expired. He was charged with
manslaughter and driving with an expired license. He served time for
it was the expired license charge that
manslaughter, but ironically,
1 42
deportation.
his
in
resulted
Miguel would return to the United States to be with his family if
he could, but as a convicted criminal re-entering without
authorization, getting caught could result in a jail sentence of twenty
years.1 4 ' Since Miguel's deportation, his wife has married someone
else who will not allow Miguel to have contact with any of his
children.'" Miguel cannot even figure out where his family lives since
they changed their phone number and moved to North Carolina.
Miguel says the only thing that keeps him going is the hope that he
will see his children again. 45 Unfortunately, Miguel's chances of
reuniting with his family are slim. He thinks that if he waits ten years
and reapplies for permanent residency it will be approved, 46 but the
sad reality is that his application will most likely be denied because of
his criminal record.
Miguel's life in El Salvador has been challenging. He has no
family there, and his finishing and painting skills are not useful in San
Salvador where the same person does carpentry, finishing, and
painting in most houses. He is surviving through the generosity of a
migrant shelter that allows him to live there as long as he works for
the shelter. Miguel's future there, however, is also insecure because
funds for the shelter have been cut off, and it is on the brink of closing
down. If that47 happens, Miguel explained, he would have no idea
where to go.1
The devastating effects of deportation on families extend to
those left behind in the United States as well. In North Carolina,
Veronica and her family own a restaurant that serves Honduran
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See Immigration and Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) (2006) (providing a
potential twenty-year punishment for those convicted of "aggravated felonies").
144. Interview by Brianna Castro with anonymous source, supra note 140.
145. When he learned that his interviewer lived in North Carolina, he desperately gave
her his name, phone number, and e-mail address as well as the names of his daughters in
case she should ever run into them.
146. Interview by Brianna Castro with anonymous source, supra note 140.
147. Id.
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food.148 With Latinos eating out less and less, however, business has
been way down, and the restaurant has stopped turning a profit. Early
in the spring of 2008, Veronica was at a loss for words when the sister
of one of her customers came in with a serious request. Veronica
barely recognized the sister and could hardly remember who the
customer was that the sister was talking about. The woman had a
nine-year-old boy and a baby with her. She explained that the mother
of those children, Veronica's customer, had been arrested while
driving to work a few weeks before and been deported. She was a
single mother and her children were left in the care of her sister who
was unable to care for them because she was unemployed and living
with a friend.' 49

When this woman asked if Veronica could take the children in
until their mother could save up enough money to return to the
United States (once again without documents) or to fly the children
to Honduras, Veronica knew she had to do something. She decided to
take in the nine-year-old boy but not the six-month-old baby. She just
could not keep an infant in the restaurant and there would be no one
at home to care for him. The boy is still living with Veronica's family
and is depressed, shy, and constantly cries for his mother and baby
brother. So far, his mother has not been able to get back to the
United States. The baby was taken from the sister by the Department
of Social Services and entered into the foster system. No one from the
family has heard anything about the baby since. 150
CONCLUSION

The expansion of border and interior enforcement operations by
the U.S. government and the movement of regulatory power over
immigration to local governments since the mid-1990s have had
dramatic economic, social, and psychological effects on immigrants,
their families, and the communities where they live and work.
Business owners report economic hardship due to the loss of
immigrant customers who fear apprehension and arrest if they leave
the safety of their homes. Trust between the police and the
community is eroding, and accusations of racial profiling and civil
rights violations seem to be on the increase. Fearing apprehension
and deportation, undocumented and legal immigrants are afraid to
148. Interview by Brianna Castro with anonymous source, undocumented immigrant,
in Selma, N.C. (May 17 & July 27, 2009).
149. Id.
150. Id.
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leave home, drive their cars, or go out in public. Their fears are wellfounded. In small towns and large cities throughout the United States,
local officials, frustrated by failed attempts to reform immigration at
the federal level, are taking the regulation of immigration into their
own hands and in the name of local security. Caught in this dragnet
are immigrant status violators who have been recategorized as
"criminal aliens," "immigration fugitives," and "absconders." '15
As our studies in Texas, North Carolina, and El Salvador have
demonstrated, the removal of these immigrants, many of whom have
established work and family ties to the United States, is devastating
for their spouses and children in the United States and abroad. Given
the disruptive economic and psychological effects that deportation
has on families, it should not be surprising that close to half of the
deportees in the 2002 and 2008 samples intended to return to the
United States to work and reunite with their spouses and children.
"In other words, [U.S. deportation] policy does not end the migration
of [undocumented] or criminal migrants; it simply raises the human
costs for migrants and their families" and undermines the cornerstone
of stated U.S. immigration policy-family reunification. 52

151. Alicia Schmidt Camacho, Hailing the Twelve Million: U.S. Immigration Law
Enforcement and the Politics of Denial and Expulsion 18 (Nov. 14, 2009) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
152. Hagan et al., supra note 4, at 89.
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